This paper attempts to shed light on greenfield FDI and cross-border M&A as distinct FDI modes of entry. The paper first develops a simple model of this decision process to derive testable predictions and then examines these predictions using firm level data on Swedish multinational corporations. The paper uses an interesting data base and offers new insights into the choice of the different entry modes. The main contribution of the paper is that evidence for tariff-jumping is lacking. In addition, firm-specific assets have no effect on cross-border M&A in the estimation.
Introduction
Multinational corporations (MNCs) typically are large entities that operate or have investments in several different countries. These corporations undertake Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in different formats: A MNC may enter a host market by acquiring an already existing local firm (cross-border mergers and acquisitions) or by establishing a new venture (greenfield FDI). Recent data shows that over the past decade most of the growth in international production has been via cross border mergers and acquisitions (cross-border M&A) . 1 The share of total cross-border M&A in world FDI flows has increased from 52% in 1987 to 83% in 1999. These figures vary considerably between developed and developing countries. For the former, the ratio is higher, having risen to nearly 100% in 1999 from 62% in 1987. Yet, surprisingly, the international trade literature on cross-border M&A is meager.
Until recently almost any discussion of MNCs has turned to the fundamental question: "Why multinational?" The interaction of trade barriers, firm specific assets, labor costs, proximity to the consumer and many other factors are used to answer this question. The MNC literature has considered the effects of these factors mainly in the context of whether or not to produce overseas but not in the context of specific types of FDI. Two strands of this literature are particularly relevant to this study. The first one suggests that one of the primary motives behind FDI is tariff-jumping and makes no distinction between cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI. 2 The second strand includes the knowledge capital models of FDI which again treat cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI as perfect substitutes. Cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI, however, are unlikely candidates for being perfect substitutes for most firms seeking foreign market access. While cross-border M&A provide rapid access to a foreign market with increased market power and a means 1 See World Investment Report (2000) . 2 The proximity-concentration hypothesis (Krugman, 1983; Markusen, 1992 and Brainard, 1993a) postulates that firms are more likely to expand production horizontally overseas the higher are trade barriers and transport costs. The predictions of these papers differ considerably from the traditional trade theory explanations of Helpman (1984) , Markusen (1984) and Ethier and Horn (1990) which suggest that firms undertake vertical FDI to exploit the factor price differences associated with different relative factor supplies. 3 The proprietary ownership of firm-specific assets and intensive use of knowledge capital are considered as another reason for the existence of MNCs. These assets are most profitably exploited internally for reasons such as asymmetric information, moral hazard and technology diffusion. FDI versus non-FDI modes of entry, specifically exporting or licensing versus Greenfield FDI have been the focus of many papers including Markusen (1987b, 1996) , Venables (1996a, 1998) and Ethier and Markusen (1996) .
of exploiting the synergies between the buyer and the seller firms, greenfield FDI offers the most profitable internal utilization of firm specific assets (R&D, marketing expenditures, scientific and technical workers, product newness and complexity and product differentiation) for reasons including moral hazard and technology diffusion.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the variations in modes of foreign market access by offering a straightforward model of FDI that involves both cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI as distinct entry modes. We then test the findings of the theory by employing a unique firm-level data set located in Sweden.
Two closely related studies are Horn and Persson (2001) and Norbäck and Persson (2004) . The former proves that in an international merger formation game without greenfield FDI domestic firms have incentives to merge in the presence of sufficiently high trade barriers in order to prevent international mergers. The latter shows that low greenfield costs and low trade costs induce cross-border M&A in a mixed international oligopoly, where state assets are sold at auction. As do these studies, the present paper endogenizes the acquisition price. By contrast, however, we portray a foreign market entry mechanism in which the acquisition price is determined through bi-lateral Nash bargaining and present an empirical analysis using a confidential firm-level database.
In addition to greenfield FDI and cross-border M&A, the model allows for exporting as another alternative for foreign market access. Exporting involves tariff and transportation costs, in other words, trade costs. One of the key advantages of FDI over exporting is that the MNC avoids trade costs. This is the traditional tariff-jumping argument. As we show, this is not necessarily the case for cross-border M&A. To this end, we consider a two-country partial equilibrium model with a homogeneous good. At the outset, there exist a finite number of identical local firms in the host country and a MNC. In the first stage, the MNC chooses its mode of entry. It can be cross-border M&A (A), greenfield FDI (G) or exporting (E). Acquisition price is determined endogenously through a bilateral Nash bargaining process rather than taken as given.
The model incorporates both trade costs and firm specific assets as distinct determinants of modes of foreign market access. The second stage of the game involves the product market interaction.
The solution of the model reveals that cross-border M&A may not always be tariffjumping. The MNC pays a linear combination of the reservation price of its own and that of the local firm. These reservation prices depend on the payoffs to both parties from a potential exporting scenario. As trade costs increase, the reservation prices of both the multinational and the local firm increase making the cross-border M&A more expensive for the multinational. Another interesting result is related to the firm-specific assets. Higher levels of these assets increase the likelihood of greenfield FDI when compared to both exporting and cross-border M&A. At moderate to high trade costs, an increase in cost asymmetry may increase the likelihood of cross-border M&A as well.
The second phase of the current study is to test these findings against real world data. In spite of the scarcity of firm-level data and the reliance on imperfect measures, empirical work on the choice of entry mode has started to emerge (Caves and Mehra (1984) , Yamawaki (1994) , O'Huallachain and Reid (1997) and McCloughan and Stone (1998) ). This line of literature has also encompassed studies at the company level (Blomstrom and Zejan (1991) , Andersson and Svensson (1994) and Smarzynska (2000)).
However, none of these papers has explored the impact of trade costs on cross-border M&A to the best of the author's knowledge. The current study, therefore, can be considered as the first attempt to address this issue by using firm-level data.
The data is one of the most important components of the present study. As mentioned in Markusen (2002) the determinants and consequences of direct investment are confused with those of portfolio capital investments in most of the FDI data sources.
Much data exists on direct investment stocks and flows, but very little exists on what the MNCs actually produced and traded and almost none on multinational affiliate production activities. This paper tests the theory propositions by using a confidential database available only inside the building of IUI (Industriens UtredningsInstitut), an independent non-profit research institution in Stockholm, Sweden. IUI data is based on surveys sent to all Swedish MNCs approximately every four years since 1960s (1965, 1970, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2002) and has achieved a remarkable 80-90% response rate due to its success in keeping the information confidential. The survey contains detailed information on the parent company as well as the operations of each individual foreign affiliate.
The empirical analysis employs multinomial logit, multivariate probit and binary logit specifications to estimate the determinants of over 100 Swedish MNCs' foreign market entry decisions across a panel of 45 countries between the years 1987 and 1998.
The result of the empirical analysis supports the theoretical results: (i) Tariff rate has a significant and negative impact on cross-border M&A in contrast to the tariff-jumping arguments.
(ii) As the R&D intensity of the MNC increases the likelihood of greenfield FDI increases and the likelihood of the other outcomes decreases. In the estimation, cost asymmetry is found to have no effect on cross-border M&A. Market size has a positive and significant effect on cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section two, a simple theoretical model is developed. Section three lays out the empirical framework employed and includes a discussion of results. This is followed by concluding remarks.
The model
There are two countries in the model, the host and the parent. A MNC from the parent country considers entering the host country market. The demand for the homogeneous good Q in the host country is determined by a linear demand function.
where P denotes the market price in the host country. There are n-1 identical local firms in the host country ( n 2 ≥ ). The multinational firm m has three entry strategies:
acquisition of one of the local firms (A); establishment of a wholly owned subsidiary, in other words greenfield FDI (G); and exporting from the parent country (E) to the host. 
For the solution of this bargaining procedure, it should be assumed that there is a positive surplus ( 0 (1 )
firm m has all the bargaining power implying that .
on the other hand firm m has no bargaining power and thus the cross-border M&A price is the same as its reservation price, i.e. .
A m F R =
The second stage of the game involves the product market where firms compete á la Cournot. The equilibrium output levels and total profits of all firms are reported in the Appendix. Finally, production and sales also take place with firms moving simultaneously. The game is solved for Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Each equilibrium point is assumed to have equal probability.
The equilibrium
This section presents the analysis of how trade costs, production cost asymmetries and bargaining strength affect the acquisition price equilibrium, profits and thus the choice of entry mode. Now consider the characterization of the equilibrium. A set of nonnegativity constraints are imposed since this model looks only at the interior solutions where both the local incumbents and the multinational are active in the product market under each different entry strategy 
In the next step, the comparative statics analysis is used to investigate the impact of the parameters of this system on the final entry decision. The following three propositions summarize the main comparative statics results derived from this model. Proof. See Appendix. ■
Recall from the introduction that the multinationals arise from the use of knowledge capital, a broad term that includes human capital of the employees, patents, blueprints and procedures, which are called firm specific assets. The multinational can reduce its production costs through the extensive use of these assets which can be provided to additional plants without reducing their value in existing plants, i.e. they have certain public good characteristics.
Proposition 2 states that a change in the cost asymmetry affects the profitability of all entry strategies in the same direction. However, one may be affected more when compared to the other. Increases in the cost asymmetry ( ) δ favor greenfield FDI more than exporting. Even though firm m, the multinational, enjoys the same amount of cost savings in both of these entry modes, the existence of trade costs in a possible exporting scenario makes greenfield FDI more profitable.
The impact of a change in δ on cross-border M&A, on the other hand, may not be as obvious. For example, an increase in cost asymmetry ( ) δ decreases the likelihood of cross-border M&A if the next best alternative is greenfield FDI. As δ increases the reservation prices of both the multinational and the local firm decrease making the crossborder M&A cheaper for the multinational. However, the profitability of the greenfield FDI increases more due to the direct effect of this change on the greenfield payoff. 
.
n n c τ δ
Proposition 3 is perhaps the most interesting result from this model. What it underlines is that high trade costs diminish cross-border M&A when exporting is the next best alternative. This may seem counterintuitive at first since a higher degree of protection is expected to favor entry. This is most commonly referred to as tariffjumping FDI. However, the proposition is consistent with the fact that the acquisition price is actually a function of trade costs. Firm m, the multinational pays a linear combination of the reservation price of its own and that of the local firm. These reservation prices are functions of the payoffs to both parties from a potential exporting scenario. As τ increases, the reservation prices of both the multinational and the local firm increase making the cross-border M&A more expensive for the multinational.
Therefore, when trade costs are high, firm m is less likely to acquire.
Another result pointed out in the second part of the proposition is that, under certain circumstances, as trade costs increase cross-border M&A become less likely compared to exporting. In other words, in the existence of moderate to high trade costs (high τ levels) and/or similar levels of firm-specific assets between the MNC and the local firms (low δ levels), increasing trade costs reduce the likelihood of cross-border M&A more than that of exporting. Then, cross-border M&A may not always be tariff jumping.
The empirical framework
This section shows how the theoretical set-up from the previous section is used to reach an estimating equation. In addition, it provides a detailed discussion of the data, its sources and limitations. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of results.
The paper adheres to the most general setting where the firm decides if and how to enter, since the choice of timing between cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI is not always clear. When a MNC considers entering an overseas market via greenfield FDI or cross-border M&A or exporting, it will opt for the alternative with the highest expected rate of return. For a potential entrant the probability of selecting one of these alternatives is a function of the expected rate of return, which depends on the parameters of the model presented in the last section:
where ikts Y is the entry strategy s chosen by firm i in country k during time period t. Initial estimates are from a standard multinomial logit MNL specification. However, a major concern is that a multinomial logit model assumes that the odds ratios are independent of the other alternatives. This is called the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) which follows from the initial assumption that the disturbances are independent and homoscedastic. To test the IIA assumption, a classic test proposed by Hausman and McFadden (1984) is used. The idea behind the Hausman test is that if a subset of the choice set is truly irrelevant, omitting it from the model altogether will not change the parameter estimates systematically. The test statistics is as follows: 
For identification purposes the variances of the epsilons must equal 1. Evaluation of the likelihood function necessitates the computation of trivariate normal integrals. For instance, the probability of observing M&A (y y y 
where 3 (.) φ is the trivariate normal probability density function, and ij ρ is the correlation coefficient between and
The applications of multivariate probit models have been limited until recently due to the fact that the required integrations of the multivariate normal density over subsets of Euclidian space are computationally burdensome. However, the development of the highly accurate GHK (Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane) probability simulator opened a gate for the applications. In this paper, the simulated maximum likelihood method using a GHK simulator is adopted, since it is found to be superior to the other simulation based models in Geweke, Keane and Runkle (1994) . Then the independence of residuals 1 2 3 , and ε ε ε is tested by using an LR test to explore the existence of nesting possibilities if any.
Finally, the robustness of the estimation results for cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI is checked by means of standard bi-logit estimation.
Data
The data set is composed of observations on the cross-border activities of Swedish MNCs 
Capital Intensity (capital expenditures divided by the number of workers) and Optimal
Plant Size (the average number of employees in the MNC's foreign affiliates at the end of each time period) are also used as measures of firm-specific assets and of bargaining power, respectively.
Gross Domestic Product is used as a measure of the market size (M). Two distinct measures are used for the Trade Costs (τ)
; the most favored nation tariff rate and distance. The version of TRAINS data used in this study gives the import tariffs for industries which can be mapped into the 10-digit level in Harmonized System. These figures are converted first into the 4-digit ISIC (rev2) by using the concordances 6 .
Finally, the newly obtained figures are mapped into the 2-digit IUI industry classification by using concordances provided by Statistics Sweden. For further details, see the summary statistics in Table 3 .
Results
Tables 4-6 report the multinomial logit, multivariate probit and binary logit estimates of the determinants of Swedish MNCs' foreign market entry decisions across a balanced panel of 45 countries between the years 1987 and 1998. Each table contains four separate regressions using different proxies for the same variable. In regression (1), trade costs are measured by the tariff rate, firm-specific assets by R&D intensity and the bargaining power of the MNC by previous affiliates. Regression (2) measures the trade costs by distance. Firm-specific assets are measured by capital-intensity in regression (3) and the bargaining power is measured by optimal plant size in regression (4). Many of the coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant across the three specifications. Region and industry dummies are generally found to be insignificant for all model specifications and are not reported for brevity.
Multinomial logit
The results of the multinomial logit estimation and the Hausman test statistics performed to test independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) are reported in Table 4 . indicates that greenfield FDI also may not be a tariff-jumping investment. Interestingly, in regression (2), when distance is used as a measure of trade costs greenfield FDI is found to be declining in trade costs.
The effect of firm-specific assets on the mode of entry in each estimating equation is as expected. High-tech firms are more dependent on their own technology creation and production technology and as a result are more likely to enter by greenfield FDI. Firmspecific assets are found to be insignificant for the choice between A and O. In regression (3), firm-specific assets are measured by capital intensity and results with this proxy tend to be weaker compared to R&D intensity. Perhaps capital intensity may be a less specific proxy for firm-specific assets.
Two proxies are used to measure for the bargaining strength of the MNC: Previous affiliates and optimal plant size. Regression (4) reports results with optimal plant size.
Both of these measures are found to increase the likelihood of acquisitions against other entry strategies. GDP has a positive and significant effect on cross-border M&A and greenfield FDI. A bigger host country market reduces the likelihood of other outcomes when compared to FDI.
The lower half of Table 4 shows the IIA test results. The standard Hausman test statistic is found be undefined when A is excluded from regressions (1) and (4) and when either A or G excluded from regressions (2) and (3). Thus, a generalized Hausman specification test through seemingly unrelated regression is used to test the IIA assumption. In all four regressions, the exclusion of A from the choice set causes a systematic difference in the parameter estimates at 10% significance level when compared to the estimates from the full choice set.
Multivariate probit
A multivariate probit specification is used to account for the correlation. The estimation results by the method of simulated maximum likelihood and LR statistic performed to test the independence of residuals are reported in Signs of almost all parameter estimates are in line with the theory. In regression (1), the tariff rate has a significantly negative effect on A and an insignificant negative impact on G suggesting no evidence for tariff-jumping in case of cross-border M&A. The likelihood of the third choice O gets higher as tariff rate increases, however. There are a number of potential explanations for why this may be true. The first explanation is due to the theory. Since the profitability of the MNC decreases in trade costs in both exporting and cross-border M&A cases, the strategy more heavily affected by trade costs will become less likely as an equilibrium outcome. If, for example, the MNC and the local firms are similar in endowments of firm-specific assets i.e. the difference τ δ − is large enough, then an increase in trade costs favors exporting in a decision between A and E.
Second, since the questionnaire does not include a specific question on the parent company exports targeting different countries until the last survey, firm-level data on exporting outcome is missing. Thus, choice O includes both exporting and no-entry. If no-entry dominates exporting within the third choice O, then an increase in tariff-rate can completely prohibit foreign market access.
In line with theory, R&D intensity has a significant positive effect on G and a significant negative impact on O. The multinational can reduce its production cost through the extensive use of these assets which can be provided to additional plants without reducing the value of them in existing plants. A parallel explanation for this phenomenon is due to Andersson and Svensson (1994) , who argue that high-tech firms are more dependent on their own technology creation and production technology and are thus more likely to enter by greenfield FDI. The significant sign of previous affiliates indicates that this increases the likelihood of A and reduces that of O. Finally, the positive coefficient on GNP suggests that bigger market size favors entry.
Regression (2) in Table 5 substitutes distance for tariff rate. All parameters preserve the sign and significance results in regression (1) but the effect of distance of G. As distance increases, the likelihood of greenfield FDI decreases suggesting evidence against tariff-jumping. Next, regression (2) replaces R&D intensity with capital intensity. Sign and significance of this variable deteriorates most probably for reasons explained in the multinomial logit specification. Last, optimal plant size is used as a measure of bargaining strength in regression (4). This variable is found to have a significant positive impact on entry indicating that the large size of a firm makes it to easier establish foreign affiliates regardless of the type of entry. Table 6 shows the results of the bi-logit specification. Under each regression equation, the first column shows the estimation results and the second column reports the elasticities. GDP, capital intensity and optimal plant size are found to be insignificant. The major results are unchanged. Tariff rate, distance, previous affiliates and R&D intensity do not change sign or significance when compared to the results from other specifications. Therefore, one can interpret the logit estimation as another robustness check.
Concluding remarks
The inadequacy of traditional theories of FDI to differentiate cross-border M&A from greenfield FDI motivates the current study. While anecdotal and empirical evidence has supported the idea that greenfield FDI and cross-border M&A are not perfect substitutes, few formal theories for this differentiation have been presented and previous empirical evidence has been mixed. This paper attempts to shed light on greenfield FDI and cross-border M&A as distinct FDI modes of entry. The paper first develops a simple model of this decision process to derive testable predictions and then examines these predictions using firm level data on Swedish multinational corporations over 1987-1998 time period. The paper uses an interesting data base and offers new insights into the choice of the different entry modes.
The paper improves and complements the existing literature in several ways. The main contribution of the paper is that evidence that M&A is driven by tariff-jumping is lacking. A potential explanation is that higher trade costs may put the local firm in a stronger bargaining position and therefore decrease the likelihood of acquisitions.
Another result is that as the technological sophistication of the MNC increases the likelihood of greenfield FDI increases, whereas the likelihood of an exporting outcome decreases. In the estimation, the cost asymmetry is found to have no effect on crossborder M&A.
Combining (1) and (2), total profits of the MNC (firm m) and a representative local firm in the host country (firm ) can be expressed respectively as 
Proof of Proposition 2.
The profitability of all entry strategies for firm m increases in δ . 
In (A.13), N={E,G} and 0, 0, 0 for <
For greenfield FDI to be more likely when compared to other modes of entry the necessary conditions are:
which is true given (A.11) and (A.12). 
The profitability of both cross-border M&A and exporting decreases in τ .
The second part of the proposition is true if and only if
which can written as
which is true if 2 1 1 ( )( 1 ).
n n c τ δ 1987-1990 1991-1994 1995-1998 Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a constant (not reported). Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a constant (not reported). Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively; all regressions include a constant (not reported). 
